“The Coherence Premium” by Paul Leinwand and
Cesare Mainardi presents the idea that coherent companies start by looking
inward to identify what they do best, selecting between 3 – 6 capabilities. Then,
they develop a strategy for how they will use these capabilities to sell their products
and succeed within their particular market. Embedded in this strategy is the
recognition that a company cannot be good at everything, but that it is
possible to excel in its strengths and base every decision on the capabilities
in focus.
The article raised some questions for me. In
the authors’ view, which would be better:
A company that identified and pursued its capabilities, but did not
yield strong profits as a result; or a company that did not develop a focused
capabilities-based strategy, but still reaped high profits? Based on the
arguments in the article, I would guess that they would favor the first
scenario, but they would argue that an organization will undoubtedly be
profitable if they develop and execute a strategy based on their strengths. But
is it possible for any organization to reap the benefits of being
capabilities-focused? Or will some still fail?
The history of Southwest Airlines exemplifies
the coherence premium as one of the factors that set it apart. At the
beginning, their strategy was based on unique offerings that other airlines
could not claim: low airfare
costs, no first class or assigned seating, punctual arrivals, fast turnaround
times at airports, and a genuine customer-focused approach that tried to make flying
fun.
Post-September 11, Southwest faced challenges
of rising energy costs, new airport security regulations, and continuing to
stand out as other carriers lowering their fares and costs. The airline successfully
maintained their strategy without increasing fares, and continued to improve
their customer service. The “bags fly free” strategy was innovative, attractive
to customers, and a financially smart move, as it was another way to stand out
against other airlines. In reevaluating their non-assigned seating policy, they
remained customer-focused. Expanding northeast and adding service from
Philadelphia and LaGuardia airports was an expansion into new geographic
locations and types of airports. This new territory did not have to mean that
they were unaligned with their core strategy. It was just new locations where
they could apply their core capabilities.
Since Southwest’s beginning, they have adapted
to the changing market, while still maintaining their core capabilities. Their
major decisions, whether in continuing their established operations or
introducing new practices, can all be described as focused and cohesive.
No comments:
Post a Comment
Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.