In our last class, we discussed whether or not Uber was a truly disruptive technology or not, letting the question remain unanswered. In light of its IPO, it’s worth looking at the strategy of the company through the lens of the readings we completed this week, in short, looking at intra-organizational dealings, market based strategies and the focus on data and scientific enquiry.
We begin by looking at Uber’s intra organizational factors. Seen as a startup comprised of software engineers, there has clearly been an emphasis on creativity, along with the pressure to deliver in recent years as losses became more apparent. In this way, creativity has been tempered with the need to deliver results, while time has been given in earlier years to develop capabilities. This has resulted in width across the market, when depth of penetration became harder to obtain (for the company as a single entity, not the entire industry comprising of Lyft, Via, Juno etc.). The company now works on Uber Eats, Uber for Freights, automated vehicles as well as Uber in the Air, a helicopter service. However, Uber certainly fails in some respects. One is certainly looking at the chain of command. Uber is very strongly top-down, rather than democratic in how it makes mist of its decisions. This was exemplified by the reputation of its previous CEO, Travis Kalanick, who led to Uber being merely “masqueraded as a democratic movement”. (1)
So much for Uber’s intra-organizational behaviors. When we look at its strategy within the market, there is an Uber folktale that comes to mind that says that Kalanick founded Uber when he was unable to find a cab in Paris. Clearly, Uber aimed to fill a scarcity, had a granular market (busy cities and possibly tourist heavy ones, possibly with a scarcity of good public transport) and the fact that there is often haggling and bargaining involved when hailing cabs slowed the working of the market. Uber created its own special capabilities through its team of highly skilled engineers and data scientists, which the taxi industry could not access.
This folktale put the company ahead of the curve, as it showed the trends of people learning to travel more across the world and then being cut off not just from familiar food (something that McDonald’s has in some way satisfied, funnily enough), but other regular services. Its strategy now had some form of on the ground data, and balanced itself between “commitment and flexibility” by aiming itself at the corporate business population. Finally, there was clearly an action plan, as evidenced by Uber’s quick development of its app.
Uber clearly used outside in strategies when creating its strategy. At its inception, Uber had to ask itself two questions: whether to continue the status quo of taxis or to focus on using technologies to create a new workforce. When broadened, there are other options such as developing another kind of public transport service or calling nearby cabs on demand, rather than using a driver’s own resources. It is unlikely that the app can malfunction a majority of the time and thus, that is a good option. Clearly, some strategies are too close to the status quo and one (creating a new public transport system) is undoable. Of course, all of Uber’s tests for each barrier are unknowable.
Uber also aimed to save time and provide comfortable, status affirming transport for its clientele, in line with the values and end aims of corporate business people. As Uber’s main competitors at the time were cabs, Uber believed it provided better capabilities, especially in areas further away where cab drivers would generally refuse to go. As to costs, while Uber did not bear costs such as car upkeep and barely any costs for their taxi drivers who are only contractors, they did have to pay an elite team of engineers to create their applications. It is unknown what the ratio of costs for cab services to the costs for Uber were. However, Uber was aware of one area and that was that its competitor could not react in a suitable way. They could not impose cutting fares for all cab drivers, as there was no sense of unity in that way, unlike in Uber, where prices are regulated by an algorithm developed by a united front, which is the company. Cab services also could not retaliate in a similar technology driven fashion, without overhauling their entire business model at great cost to themselves. This, at the end of the day, gave Uber its competitive advantage and edge in the market.
At the end of the day, there are clear gaps in our knowledge of Uber’s strategy, but we can see enough to see that while it has not gained in profit, its growth and marketshare is immense, now having crossed continents. And as its IPO comes up and we see the angry reactions of employees off the backs of which Uber has profited, either through unfair pay or not listening to them, we shall know the future of the company and the usefulness of its strategy.