In
analyzing blue ocean strategy, disruptive technology, and emerging markets, I
wanted to understand more about the transplantation of strategies that successfully
created blue oceans. I ultimately found a case about Wal-Mart attempting to
transplant its successful retail strategy in China.
In
The Coherence Premium, Leinwand and
Mainardi (2010) note that Walmart achieves "maximum efficiency" by
integrating the following four capabilities: "aggressive vendor
management, expert point-of-sale data analytics, superior logistics, and rigorous
working-capital management." This allowed Wal-Mart to deliver on its
"Everyday Low Prices" guarantee, thereby creating a new retail model
that captured a majority segment of the retail market. In this way, Wal-Mart
initially created an "uncontested market space that made the competition
irrelevant" (Kim & Mauborgne, 2004). Wal-Mart also proved that
"large R&D budgets are not the key to creating new market space—the
key is making the right strategic moves" (Kim & Mauborgne, 2004). Accordingly,
much of Wal-Mart’s success in the United States can be attributed to (i) its largely
uncontested rise in securing rural—and eventually urban—markets (generally an "uncontested market space"); (ii) low costs
during inception as a result of rural targeting; (iii) its eventual negotiating
power with regard to suppliers; (iv) company-controlled shipping and logistics
management; (v) centralized, rapid replenishment through the use of
distribution centers; and (vi) a domestic business environment allowing financial
prudence and cost control (Farhoomand, 2006).
Yet,
the conditions that allowed Wal-Mart to achieve near-complete control from the
point of purchase to the point of sale did not exist in China. Significant
government regulation, market disparities, unpredictable expenses, deficient
technical and civil infrastructure, business irregularities, and unanticipated
consumer habits complicated Wal-Mart’s attempts to implement its proven system (Farhoomand,
2006). Hundreds of domestic and international firms struggled to dominate a
limited—albeit growing—market, and the company had little competitive advantage
beyond existing international infrastructure and an ostensibly-proven business
model (Farhoomand, 2006). Wal-Mart had largely succeeded in the U.S. and other
Western countries because it created a market around dependably-low prices and
customer care. This market needed to be rebuilt in China among a sea of
carbon-copy competitors, and Wal-Mart had no strategy beyond “business as usual.”
Ultimately,
a highly-efficient model works only as well as the environment allows; conditions
in China could not support Wal-Mart’s system despite its success in North
America and Europe. Accordingly, Wal-Mart managers’ firm belief “that consumers
were alike everywhere around the world in searching for quality products at
great prices and desiring to be treated well” served as a disadvantage in that
it prevented the company from looking at the Chinese market as a unique entity
requiring a unique approach (Farhoomand, 2006).
In
this sense, Wal-Mart might have succeeded sooner by instead implementing a discovery-driven
planning approach—that is, an approach that leverages "plans for
learning" rather than "plans for implementation" (Christensen,
2006). Like Christensen describes with HP, Wal-Mart instead made broad
assumptions based on previous (and generally non-applicable) business plans. The
company could have "[felt] its way into the market…, redirecting their
program if necessary and building upon what they learned on the way"—much in
the same way it did in the United States during its inception (Christensen,
2006).
Admittedly, this applies considerations regarding disruptive technologies generally to the idea of blue ocean strategy and strategy transplantation, which might be incorrect.
Admittedly, this applies considerations regarding disruptive technologies generally to the idea of blue ocean strategy and strategy transplantation, which might be incorrect.
References:
Christensen,
C.M. (2006). The Innovator's Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms
to Fail. Boston MA: Harvard Business School Publishing.
Leinwand,
P., & Mainardi, C. (2010). The Coherence Premium. Harvard Business School
Publishing.
Farhoomand,
A. (2006). Wal-Mart Stores: “Every Day Low Prices” in China. Boston, MA:
Harvard Business School Publishing.
Kim,
W.C., & Mauborgne, R. (2004). Blue Ocean Strategy. Boston, MA: Harvard
Business School Publishing.
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