Christensen
defines disruptive technologies as those that bring to market a different value
proposition than previously available.
Executives usually do not invest in disruptive technologies for three
main reasons: 1) They are simpler and cheaper, resulting in lower profit
margins. 2) Disruptive technologies are
first commercialized in emerging and often insignificant markets. 3) Big companies’ most profitable customers
usually do not want and initially cannot even use disruptive technologies.
The Christensen article reminds me of
another book of his, “Disrupting Class,” which I read for a Heinz course in
education policy. The book discusses how
an entity, such as a school, is rarely able to disrupt itself. As a solution to the dilemma of disrupting
education with technological innovation, he proposes that a new, prominent
administrative role be introduced to the school system: Technology
Implementation Specialist.
The Specialist should be responsive
primarily to an outside body, such as the school district, in order to avoid conflicts
of interest between the school and the Specialist. For example, if a Specialist were hired
directly by the principal, relationships may form in which the Specialist feels
obligated to be less harsh on teachers who are not properly implementing technology. Whereas a third-party Specialist might more
objectively assess proper implementation, an in-house Specialist might worry
that a negative assessment will result in their colleague being fired.
Similarly, John Chambers of Cisco
describes how “spin-ins” are projects initially moved out of the company to
help them operate more like start-ups.
Once the desired technology is innovated, they are spun back into the
company to apply the innovation. In
other words, Chambers developed a mechanism that mimics the method discussed by
Christensen in both the education policy example and this week’s excerpts.
I have found that bringing in a
third-party observer is useful in even smaller systems than corporate companies
or school districts. I used to work at a
lobby firm in Tokyo. Some of our clients
were large pharmaceutical corporations, while others were smaller service companies.
I found that often what a client needed was not necessarily lobbying services,
but a third-party observer that could generate fresh strategies for penetrating
the Japanese government and/or market.
In some cases, this meant serving as an arbiter between two competing
strategies within the company. In other
cases, it meant innovating new strategies that the company had trouble
devising, perhaps due to the cultural biases of their home country.
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