There are many companies in history which have not managed disruptive
innovation in their industry well and have perished. A particular case study[1]
which I found interesting is about Encyclopedia Britannica. Encyclopedia
Britannica is the world’s oldest continuously published encyclopedia. First
published in 1768, its latest version was printed in 2010. 1990 and 1991 was
when its annual revenues were at its peak of $650 million. The advent of
personal computers in 1980 and digital content technology like CD-ROMs was the
disruptive innovation which Britannica did not manage properly. The story of
how the management of Encyclopedia Britannica rejected the offer of Bill Gates’s
Microsoft to collaborate to produce content of Windows PC’s in 1985 is now
folklore. Clay Christensen in his book Innovator’s Dilemma explains how
disruption is not something which happens suddenly and overnight, in “Principle#5:
Technology Supply May Not Equal Demand” he elaborates on how disruptive
technologies can only be used initially by a very small market segment remote
from the mainstream. This is exactly what happened with Encyclopedia Britannica
and PC revolution, who knew in 1985 when PC household penetration was just 4-5%
that Microsoft would grow to be the behemoth it is today. I do not accuse the
management of Britannica for being short sighted back then in rejecting the
Microsoft’s offer. Britannica in fact took a strategic decisions in response
and introduced CD-ROM version of its Compton’s Encyclopedia, well before Microsoft’s
Encarta emergence in 1993.
Figure 1 Excerpt from "The Crisis at Encyclopedia
Britannica" KEL251 28, July2009
Looking at the timeline it is clear that Britannica did
anticipate a shift towards digital content, they might have underestimated the
pace of this shift but they did start early and had an advantage with its
superior content and record sales. Inspite of the early realization of a
possible disruption in the industry, Britannica lost out on the opportunities
to transform itself because of its organization structure. It is a classic case
of Christensen’s “Principle#4: An Organization’s Capabilities Define its
Disabilities”. The very sales organization at Britannica which brought home
record sales was to become its Achilles heel when it came to digital transformation.
Sales organization which was pivotal to Britannica’s book sales had no
incentive to promote the new CD-ROM encyclopedia format as they enjoyed commissions
as high as $600 on single traditional sale. The sales force was highly skilled
in door-to-door book sales but they hardly had any computer knowledge to even
show a good demo of their digital product which could possibly justify its
steep $895 price tag. Britannica did not create a sales organization structure
conducive to promote the sales of digital content. It reminded me of Cisco’s CEO’s
approach of “spin-in”, a group of individuals who would operate on a specific
project as a start-up separate from the parent organization but with the
resources of the parent organization. “spin-in “would have been a good approach
for Britannica to take - have a different organization which focused on
creating high quality digital content products with its own sales organization separate
from the door-to-door sales force.
[1] “The
Crisis at Encyclopedia Britannica” by Shane Greenstein and Michelle Devereux,
Kellog School of Management, July 28, 2009.

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